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Freedom of Speech and the Limits of UK Criminal Legislation 
 
 
Elimma C. Ezeani∗∗
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article draws attention to the fact that while the application of criminal law may 
serve to punish racially aggravated offences where they can be proved, such 
legislation in themselves do little to address the causes or, to limit the occurrence of 
racially motivated attacks (or ‘hate crimes’ in American legal parlance). Our analysis 
is undertaken in the background of UK legislation and the lessons from two UK 
television programmes which reawakened the debate on the use of hate speech and 
the recourse to criminal legislation in tackling human rights issues. The essay is in 
three parts. Part I examines the two television programmes referred to above – 
reviewing the application of relevant criminal legislation to the allegations therein and 
the impact of the media’s action in these circumstances on the race relations debate 
in the UK. Part II assesses whether criminal legislation can in the circumstances 
effectively counter racial prejudice. Part III examines the need for education and 
social action including whether UK legislation needs to put more effort into finding 
more enduring alternatives to criminal legislation in its bid to maintain a fair and 
tolerable society. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
National governments have been keen to adapt human rights provisions to their 
internal legal systems for purposes beyond compliance with human rights 
international standards. The central aim of this domestic application of international 
human rights principles in the increasingly diverse communities of the modern world 
is for the purposes of social control. With increased diversity, States are 
understandably keen to maintain the peaceful co-existence of all members of society. 
                                               
∗ ∗ LLB Ife (Hons), B.L Hons (Nig), LLM RGU (Dist.) PhD KCL. The views expressed in this 
article were presented at the Human Rights in the 21st Century session of the International 
Graduate Law Research Conference at King’s College London, 12-13 April 2007. Thanks to 
Ms Maleiha Malik, Lecturer King’s College London, who patiently provided insight into UK 
anti-discrimination debate. 
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In order to do this, legislation has moved from the internal adoption of human rights 
provisions to the use of criminal legislation in order to address the incidences of 
racially aggravated offences. Such legislation includes the establishment of criminal 
punishment for acts or commissions which are considered to be racially motivated.  
 
In general, ‘hate crime’ encompasses criminal acts which are motivated by no other 
cause than a feeling of hatred for another person, or a group of persons. Such hatred 
can be against another’s colour, creed or religious belief, sexual orientation, 
language. Of all these, those actions based on an attack of racial are the most easily 
identifiable specifically because of the physical differentiations which characterise 
and emphasise racial differences – colour, hair texture, physique, etc. In modern 
multicultural societies, owing to the increase in geographical mobility and 
international immigration, racial discrimination has acquired even more notoriety than 
ever before. The September 11 bombings in the United States, the Bali nightclub 
bombings, the July 7 attacks on the London tubes; all incidents of which recorded 
unprecedented fatalities, and the ongoing [military] action against suspected 
terrorists, have given rise to more than an awareness of terrorism. These incidences 
sadly but inevitably reignited the suspicion and, racial discrimination between 
persons of different identities not only across diplomatic ties, but within societies and, 
amongst private individuals. 
 
In the aftermath of the above mentioned ‘acts of terror’, domestic legislation has had 
to give stronger consideration to the need for balancing individual rights. UK 
legislation has also focused on identifying the right of a person to be free from racially 
motivated attacks even as it preserves the freedom of expression to its citizens under 
its Human Rights Act (HRA). In employing criminal legislation as a principal means of 
tackling racially aggravated offences, we argue that there is a curious neglect of the 
Journal of Comparative Law 
Islamic University of Uganda 
Vol 3 (Jan 2009) pp135-172 
 
 3 
fact that individuals’ emotions cannot and ought not to be coerced by law. Individual 
prejudices are formed out with the purview of law; they arise in the psyche and are 
encouraged by the society the individual finds himself or herself in. The debate on 
racially motivated crimes therefore falls on either side of the question on whose rights 
hold greater value before the State?  
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that ‘freedoms’ also include the right of a person 
to freely express one’s like or dislike of another. This freedom should thus extend to 
a ‘right’ not to be punished for acts which are merely expressions of an individual 
philosophy and should not be construed as racially discriminative and therefore 
criminal. On the other hand, it could also be argued that every person has a right to 
expect freedom from such discrimination and for protection from the State. Both of 
these arguments assume that the States has a duty to prevent harm to others in this 
instance by admitting that whereas an individual may hold an objectionable view, 
such a view will be punishable under criminal law in order to prevent the harm it may 
cause to others.  
 
Kahan (2001, p.175) is of the view that these opposite perceptions arise in the 
shadow of ‘the Millian premise that the state is justified in coercing an individual only 
to prevent harm to others and not to condemn that individual for holding 
objectionable views, values or preferences’ 1. Various academic arguments have 
examined the use of criminal legislation to address racially motivated attacks2
 
 and we 
need not restate them. Our present concern however rests on the premise that 
greater emphasis ought to be placed on civil regulation and projects which promote 
the inalienable right to dignity as an appeal to the faulty reasoning and emotions 
which give rise to racist and other ‘hate’ behaviour.   
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Race legislation and the criminal punishment attached do not address the real or 
imagined threats often underscored by long festering racial prejudice which 
predispose one to race discrimination. Furthermore, although criminal punishment 
can ‘punish’ the offender, it is not sufficient to ‘deter’ further offences indeed it can 
even lead to a deeper hatred of the victim by the one who feels unjustly punished for 
expressing a private opinion.  
 
What is crucial here is for the State to review the option of appealing to reason; for 
domestic policies which go to the core of racist action. It is important that domestic 
government must include and protect in national laws, the individual’s duty to respect 
the fundamental right of every person to be treated with dignity. Holding up this right 
as moral and inalienable and for the benefit of all in the society can assist in curbing 
the spread of a misguided sense of supremacy and that lack of respect for others 
which even if not brought to the fore in the public domain (in order to avoid legal 
retribution) is given free rein in private human interactions, daily.  Legislative force 
should therefore be given to those other positive action including education, inclusive 
diversity programmes, media regulation, and increased access to minorities; cultural 
policy which can prevent the often tragic consequences of racially aggravated 
behaviour when they occur between private individuals.  
 
These views are assessed in the background of the debates on race relations in the 
UK reignited by two incidences brought to public attention by the broadcast media. 
These programmes highlighted the more prevalent instances of racial behaviour; 
instances which are practically endemic in modern Britain. Given the private context 
of the racial behaviour in both instances, the failure of a finding for criminal 
punishment for the ‘offenders’ in the course of the judicial process, in our view 
buttresses the fact that criminal legislation is not the sufficient answer to tackling race 
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crimes on the long run. The first is the UK Channel 4 programme, Celebrity Big 
Brother (CBB) UK 2007 and the second, The Secret Agent; a BBC documentary 
(secret filming) of a meeting by the British National Party (BNP) in January 2004, 
which became the subject of a legal dispute in November 2006.  
 
 
PART I. LESSONS FROM TELEVISION  
 
1. ‘Celebrity Big Brother (UK) 2007’ and ‘The Secret Agent’ 
The reality programme Celebrity Big Brother UK (2007) was aired between 3rd-28th 
January 2007. The programme which had erstwhile suffered a decline in viewing 
ratings, increased its falling standards after a controversial and topical public debate 
arose from the relations between one of the participants and a group of others3. The 
public was shocked at the harassment and the obvious distress which one of the 
participants in the programme suffered when she was subjected to ‘racist bullying’4
 
. 
Outrage was also directed at the programme’s producers and the bosses of Channel 
4 who had allowed the abuse to go on and had distastefully aired the altercations. 
The UK version of the Celebrity Big Brother Series in its 7th season invited a host of 
media recognisable personalities (aka celebrities), in January 2007. One  of the 
housemates was an actress who was from and lives, in India5. As part of its usually 
unforeseen adaptations to the programme, the producers invited a new participant6 
who had previously been on the original Big Brother format and who had as a result 
of her previous appearance become a celebrity in her own right, to return as a new 
housemate on the Celebrity 2007 series.7
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In the course of their seclusion while under constant surveillance, the watching public 
was treated to a sequence of harassing and abusive behaviour against Ms Shetty, by 
Ms Jade Goody and two other housemates, Ms Danielle Lloyd and Ms Jo O’Meara.  
These included: 
 
Following a discussion the group had with Ms Shetty about how long it took to 
cook a chicken, Goody, O'Meara amd Lloyd decided she had made them all 
ill. "No wonder I keep getting the s***s," commented O'Meara.  
 
Others complained that Shetty had touched housemates' food with her hands 
after she picked up morsels from people's plates with Lloyd saying: "You don't 
know where those hands have been."  
 
In a row between Ms Goody and Ms Shetty, responding to the latter’s 
statement, “You need elocution lessons”, Ms Goody stated, “You need a day 
in the slums. F***ing go in your community. F***ing go in your community and 
go to all those people who look up to you and be real.  
 
Danielle Lloyd speaking out of earshot from the actress, said, "I think she 
should f*** off home.".8
The use of swear words, insults, abusive comments and the complicit laughter of 
other housemates have not been denied by the broadcasters. Rather Channel 4 
claimed that the behaviour was due to ‘a clash of cultures and class’
  
9. The official 
broadcast regulator Ofcom, saw an unprecedented 27,000 records of complaints 
about the programme after Hertfordshire police under whose precinct the programme 
was being made had reported 30 telephone calls complaining against the 
broadcast10. The main accused housemate in her media interviews did not deny her 
actions were wrong.11 Other social commentary has not hesitated to condemn the 
attacks while calling for a more incisive review on the state of race relations in the 
UK.12  
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The second programme involved top officers of the British National Party (BNP). The 
Party has a history of accusations of racism and intentions to stir hatred beginning 
with its founder John Tyndall and the BBC documentary exposed current racist 
thinking within the organisation13
 
. On 10 November 2006 in the Leeds Crown Court, 
the leader of the BNP, Nick Griffin was acquitted along with a colleague on the 
charge that he had intended to stir up racial hatred by the contents of a speech made 
to supporters on 19 January 2004. The BNP, a far right political organisation founded 
in 1982 includes in its mission statement that the party ‘exists to secure a future for 
the indigenous peoples of Britain and others of similar Caucasian ancestry.  
The party argues that these people, ‘are facing denial of service provision, failure to 
secure business contracts as well as poor job prospects as both reverse 
discrimination excludes [our] people from the school room, workplace and 
boardroom’14. The Party stance on immigration gives an insight to the philosophy 
behind the mission statement. The BNP seeks ‘an immediate halt to all future 
immigration’ including the repatriation of all non-white Britons to their countries of 
origin asserting that “positive discrimination” schemes have ‘made white Britons 
second class citizens’15
 
. 
The BBC documentary filmed a meeting of the BNP in secret by an undercover 
reporter 16. There, the BNP leader, Nick Griffin stated that Islam was a “wicked, 
vicious faith” and that Muslims were turning Britain into a “multi-racial hell hole”. His 
colleague, a Mr Colette, at the same event said, “Let’s show these ethnics the door in 
2004.”17 In his defence, Nick Griffin’s barrister argued that the words were part of a 
“campaign speech of an official and legitimate party.”18 The speech was made in 
private, to a group of people and only came to public attention because it had been 
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aired by the BBC in April 2004. In its statement, the broadcaster defended its action 
stating that it was its job to bring such matters of public interest to general attention.  
 
Bringing the matter of racism and the moral dilemma it presented to general attention 
was certainly what the two programmes achieved. Yet it was not only the incidences 
of alleged racial abuse that were brought up for consideration. Many also questioned 
why the broadcasters in the respective circumstances, brought the programmes to 
public attention. After all, in the case of the BNP, its policies were already well known 
and were in fact available on the party’s web site. Could the makers of the Celebrity 
Big Brother programme not have shielded the public from the unpleasantness 
between the inmates?  
 
2. The Importance and Effect of Media action  
The importance and effect of media action in the realm of race relations must be 
acknowledged because although the media is expected to be objective and factual in 
its reports, those who bring the news to public awareness also have ‘the power to 
marginalise and construct racial or ethnic minorities as “other”…’19 ; a ‘power [that] 
comes from the capacity to make connections, to represent events or issues in the 
context of pre-existing fears or prejudices.’20
 
 Therefore it is certainly proper that the 
public should ask these questions: Was there a deliberate intention by the Television 
channels to exacerbate racial tension for the sake of improved viewing? Were these 
programmes put out to the public because the issues raised were as the BBC 
maintained, for the benefit of public enlightenment? 
Reviewing the action of the media in bringing these programmes and the social 
prejudices they portrayed in our view we find that the media acknowledged the 
existence of deep seated prejudices existing in multiracial Britain. What the media did 
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with these two programmes was to haul the race relations debate onto the centre 
stage. Racial abuse or ‘hate crime’ was therefore no longer a matter for the courts 
and the legislature alone. The public was also included. Solomos J and Back L (1996) 
have suggested that press coverage of events do a service in arousing ‘wide ranging 
debate about the future of race relations in British society’.21 This opinion is echoed 
in a later UK Home Office study on racial harassment which stated that ‘[N]o other 
group of individuals have as much power as the media to affect the image that 
people have of members of the ethnic minorities’ and warned that ‘[U]nbalanced and 
inaccurate reporting…can all too easily provide a spurious justification for racial 
harassment’.22
 
   
In respect of both Channel 4 and the BBC, it cannot be denied that the television 
media successfully kept the issue of race relations in the public domain. In doing so, 
both broadcasters went a step further than the usual media coverage of incidences 
wherein racial discrimination has been suspected to be the motive of aggravated 
attacks. Without focusing solely on the victim and the consequences of the attack on 
the latter, the reality programme CBB UK 2007 allowed the public a rare opportunity 
of immediately identifying the perpetrators of the alleged racial offence.23
 
 The same 
could also be said of the BBC broadcast, The Secret Agent, which not only identified 
the political group behind the statements ie the BNP, but also identified the particular 
members of the party who had made the statements. 
In our view, deciding therefore if the television channels were only fulfilling their 
obligation of public enlightenment or whether the programmes deliberately stirred up 
racial hatred presents no difficulty. In airing the reality programme, Channel 4 
appears to have acted within the Code of Broadcasting applied by the regulatory 
body Ofcom giving the programme the necessary legitimacy demanded of the 
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broadcaster in its choice of programmes for public viewing. Section 2, Part 2 of the 
Ofcom Code 2005 states: 
 
 In applying generally accepted standards broadcasters must ensure that 
material which may cause offence is justified by the context…. Such material 
may include, but is not limited to, offensive language, violence, sex, sexual 
violence, humiliation, distress, violation of human dignity, discriminatory 
treatment or language (for example, on the grounds of age, disability, gender, 
race, religion, beliefs and sexual orientation)… 
 
The ‘context’ referred to here covers matters such as the editorial content of the 
broadcast; the time and service of the programme, the likely size, composition and 
expectations of the potential audience; the degree of harm or offence likely to be 
caused by the inclusion of any particular sort of material in the programme.24
 
 Reality 
programmes have to be put in their proper context. They are a peculiar genre of 
Television broadcasting designed to give a real insight into the characters who are 
part of the programme. While careful editing of the contents of television programmes 
should take away the parts of a programme which would cause offence as the Ofcom 
Code provision immediately above seeks to avoid, by their very nature, reality 
programmes cannot comply with these expectations without compromising on the 
promise to deliver ‘reality’.  
Scrupulous editing can have the undesirable effect of making a ‘reality’ programme, a 
‘normal’ one, limiting the number of viewers who tune into the programme precisely 
because they want to know what is going on when other people (particularly well 
known people) place themselves and their private actions in public view. By 
accepting to be part of a media programme of this nature, it is only reasonable to 
assume that participants ought to have been aware that their words or actions would 
be subjected to public (and legal) censure. 
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In respect of the role of the BBC in bringing to the public awareness the meeting of 
the BNP, the BBC Royal Charter includes in the terms of the said legal instrument, 
that the BBC exists ‘to serve the public interest’ and that the Corporation’s main 
object was ‘ the promotion of its public purposes.’25  These public purposes which 
include ‘sustaining citizenship and civil society’ and ‘promoting education and 
learning’ are to be achieved ‘through the provision of output which consists of 
information, education and entertainment’.26
 
 The political nature of the comments by 
the BNP party leaders affirms the action of the BBC in consonance with its legal 
Charter. Informing the public of the philosophy and thinking at the background of 
such a public body as a legitimate political party can only be construed as beneficial 
to the electorate who have a right to know the agenda of any political group which 
requests the public mandate.  
In both circumstances, an important distinction must be made between a 
broadcasters ‘intent to stir up racial hatred’, and the ‘intent to bring certain facts 
relating to racial hatred’ to public attention. In their respective contexts, a ‘reality’ 
programme and a secretly filmed ‘documentary’, should present the matters as they 
are. This of course means that just as there are unpleasant reports in the media 
every day, contents of certain television programmes which focus on personal private 
behaviour may evidence facts which will be distasteful. to some members of the 
public.  
 
Therefore, the argument by both the BBC and Channel 4 respectively, that each 
broadcaster was fulfilling its legal and commercial obligations outweighs any counter 
argument that in these instances, the broadcasters intended to stir up racial hatred27. 
The importance of these media events should not be underrated. While it may have 
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been more pleasant to rest on the ignorance of the pervasiveness of racially 
aggravating behaviour, public enlightenment has here created an awareness which 
ought to spur the State in particular and the public in general to concrete action 
towards protecting the dignity of each individual in the society. 
 
PART II: CAN CRIMINAL LEGISLATION COUNTER RACIAL PREJUDICE? 
 
1. CBB UK 2007 
In the above context, the principal accusation was that the victim was subjected to 
‘racist bullying’. There was no doubt that isolating the victim; speaking about her in a 
condemnatory and discriminatory manner and doing so with the support of other 
persons must have put Ms Shetty in an unenviable position. In the course of 
investigations into the allegations and complaints of racial abuse, three provisions of 
criminal law were cited as being relevant to any legal proceedings in respect of the 
incident: the Crime and Disorder Act (1998);  the Protection from Harassment Act 
(1997) and;  the Public Order Act (1986). Were any of these provisions actually 
sustainable against those accused of racial abuse in the CBB programme including 
the broadcaster itself? Are these provisions in themselves sufficient to counter the 
racial prejudice alleged in the interpersonal dealings of the programme participants? 
We examine these questions. 
 
a. The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) 28 does not expressly state that ‘racist bullying’ 
which was what was complained against in the CBB programme amounts to an 
offence. S.28(1) of the Act identifies racially aggravated behaviour as where a person 
demonstrates hostility towards the victim based on the victim’s membership of a 
racial group. S.28(4) identifies a “racial group” as ‘a group of persons defined by 
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reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national 
origins’. Certain conduct can constitute racially aggravated offences including 
assaults (S.29), criminal damage (S.30), public order offences (S.31) and 
harassment (S.32). 
 
The importance of this clarity in identification by criminal legislation on what would 
constitute an offence under the legislation cannot be overemphasised. Saucier et al 
(2008) in a recent study note that ‘[H]ate crimes are crimes committed against 
individuals because that are perceived to be members of a particular social group. 
Their perceived membership in that group, not anything idiosyncratic about them as 
individuals makes them vulnerable’29
 
.  
It must immediately be pointed out that the complaints in this instant referred to 
statements/speech made by the accused housemates. Under the provisions (for 
England and Wales) cited above, ‘speech’ has not been expressly included as 
potential racially aggravated conduct. In our view this leaves a lacuna in the criminal 
provisions addressing racist behaviour in England and Wales, as it denies the 
harmful effects of racially motivated speech. We find that the Scottish laws have 
noted this lacuna. In the provisions on racially aggravating course of conduct which 
amounts to a harassment in Scotland, S.33 of the Crime and Disorder Act expressly 
states in an amendment to the  Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, 
that racially aggravating ‘conduct’ includes ‘speech’. 
 
Since the CBB affair originated in England, we will primarily address the provisions 
as they relate to England and Wales. Were the derogatory remarks against Ms 
Shetty made because she was Indian? Was she badly treated because she was a 
member of a particular social group? We cannot affirm that the treatment meted out 
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was based on these considerations. For a criminal charge to be sustained, mens rea  
or criminal intent would have to be proved against those accused in the first instance. 
The difficulty of proving intent in such emotive circumstances has previously been 
examined. (Steiker 1999; Dillof 1997; Robinson, 1992). What is pertinent in our 
present deliberations is that as Hurd (2001) notes, ‘it is possible to feel hatred 
towards particular persons…without being disposed to feel hatred towards groups of 
persons generally…’.30
 
  
The Act states that an offence is committed where hostility is shown to a person 
because that person is a member of a particular group. Therefore to be racist, ‘is to 
be disposed to believe that members of another race are inferior, and to act in ways 
that subjugate such persons’31
 
. For those who watched the incidents (and I did) what 
was apparent was that the other girls felt uncomfortable with the foreigner’s 
mannerisms, her surprisingly excellent grasp of English and the fact that she seemed 
rather popular with the older men in the house! The hostility stemmed from these 
facts alone.  
We believe that the words and behaviour employed were only in keeping with what 
they (the accused housemates) would normally do if faced with such a situation32. 
We recall that the Crime and Disorder Act itself does not suggest that all aggravating 
behaviour because they are shown to someone of a different race will necessarily 
constitute an offence without a show of hostility towards that other based on the 
latter’s membership of a racial group. Even if the others accused of racially 
aggravating behaviour were in their private consciences disposed to believe that 
members of Ms Shetty’s race were inferior, their actions in the programme though 
terrible, in no way reflected a hatred of Ms Shetty’s race. For this reason, we are of 
the view that even if the provisions of Scotland were applicable in the instant matter, 
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the speech ie statements of the accused housemates would still not amount to an 
offence under the Crime and Disorder Act.  
 
b. The Public Order Act (1986) 
S.31(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act further provides for racially aggravated public 
order offences. It states that a person is guilty if that person commits any of the 
following offences which is racially aggravated: 
 
(a) an offence under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 (fear or 
provocation of violence); 
(b) an offence under section 4A of that Act (intentional harassment, alarm or 
distress); or 
(c) an offence under section 5 of that Act (harassment, alarm or distress), 
 
The Public Order Act, Sections 17-29, cover the instances of racial hatred. S.17 
defines racial hatred for the purposes of the Act as ‘…that hatred against a group of 
persons in Great Britain defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including 
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’. Instances of racial hatred could arise in the 
course of or under any of the following: words, behaviour or written material (S.18); 
publication or distribution of written material (19); public performance of a play (S.20); 
distribution, playing or showing of a recording (S.21); broadcast of a racist 
programme service (S. 22).  
 
Did the fact of the programme’s display to the pubic make these provisions any more 
relevant to the incident? Are they enough to presume culpability on the part of the 
broadcaster who published the programme? We do not think so. The semblance of 
privacy given to the participants on CBB in the secluded Big Brother House would 
have contributed to making the housemates relax their guard and react in their typical 
fashion to confrontations with their fellow housemates. They were in a private 
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dwelling. They would expect that what they said to each other was only between 
them. On this particular occasion, the broadcaster, Channel 4 would have been of 
the same view and rightly so. It was merely providing the public with the day to day 
activities of the housemates in line with the format of the programme.   
 
There is also a further reprieve for the housemates accused of racist bullying, under 
an amendment to the Public Order Act 33
 
 where a person is accused of causing 
intentional harassment, alarm or distress. Sub section.4A(3) of S. 154 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act (1994) provides that in such cases, it is a defence for an 
accused to prove that his conduct was reasonable because being inside a dwelling, 
there was no reason to believe that the words or behaviour would be seen or heard 
by a person outside the dwelling. Should any of the persons accused of racist 
behaviour in the Big Brother House have believed that their words or behaviour 
would be so seen or heard?  
Regardless of the constant surveillance in the Big Brother House and although the 
participants knew of this surveillance, it could be argued that none of the housemates 
saw themselves as being in the same building with the viewing public. They were to 
all intents and for the purposes of the programme, living a ‘normal’ life in the privacy 
of the Big Brother House. They were being filmed for a reality television series which 
by implication, meant that they related with each other as they normally would, ‘inside 
a dwelling’. 
 
c. The Protection from Harassment Act (1997) 
Sections1-3 of the above Act provide that it is an offence for anyone to pursue a 
conduct which amounts to the harassment of another and which is known or ought to 
be known would amount to harassment of that other. However, in the context of the 
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instant incident, we must return to certain exceptions relevant here which arise under 
the previously mentioned amendment to the Public Order Act, dealing with the 
provisions on harassment34
 
 An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, 
except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, 
or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person 
inside a dwelling and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is 
also inside that or another dwelling.
. The amendment states that harassment is a criminal 
offence where a person causes another harassment, alarm or distress by ‘using 
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour’ or 
‘displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting’. This provision is however qualified by the location of the 
persons involved and the potential of any threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour, to be seen or heard by person outside the building. It states: 
35
 
 
All the persons involved in the rows were inside the Big Brother house, at the same 
time. No verbal abuse or racial comment was directed at any other person or group, 
apart from the housemate who was the victim of the ill treatment. The public viewers 
of the programme including any who were members of Ms Shetty’s social or racial 
group although they were privy to the activities of the housemates, were technically 
not inside the Big Brother House, ie the building. Therefore, it could not be said that 
the public was physically present when the alleged offence was committed so as to 
bring the relevant provisions of the Pubic Order Act to bear on the CBB programme.  
 
In the final analysis, criminal legislation proved ineffective both in theory and in 
practice in respect of the allegations of racist behaviour in Celebrity Big Brother UK 
2007. No charges were brought either against the persons accused of racist 
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behaviour or against Channel 4. We will consider the second programme next to 
examine the effectiveness of criminal legislation as applied to that circumstance.  
 
2. The Secret Agent (the BNP case) 
This programme and its contribution to the race debate in the UK appears simple and 
clear cut, on the face of it. The BNP leader and his colleague Mr Collette were 
charged before a Leeds Crown Court for their statements in the secretly filmed 
meeting, on charges of incitement to racial hatred pursuant to the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. In his summation to the jury before the latter retired to 
deliberate on their verdict, the presiding judge offered the following opinion: 
We live in a democratic society which jealously protects the rights of its 
citizens to freedom of expression, to free speech. That does not mean it is 
limited to speaking only the acceptable, popular or politically correct things. It 
extends to the unpopular, to those which many people may find unacceptable, 
unpalatable and sensitive.36
The jury returned a verdict of acquittal.  
  
The facts of this programme in our view, reveal a far more harmful incidence of 
racially aggravating behaviour that in the CBB case above. Mason G (2007) referring 
to previous discourse on the subject, acknowledges that there remain controversy 
over how the concept of hate crime should be defined. We are partial to the view that 
criminal conduct motivated by prejudice will suffice as evidence of hate crime. 
(Jacobs & Potter, 1998, p.11). We have noted that the Scottish provisions on racially 
aggravated conduct under the Crime and Disorder Act include ‘speech’. This in our 
view is the better approach to tackling racially aggravating behaviour at its roots. 
Speech is the most frequent expression of misconduct in relation to racially 
aggravating behaviour. It is also the most basic. Next we examine the two incidents 
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from television and consider whether indeed criminal legislation as it stands will 
suffice to counter the primary signs of racial behaviour typified by racially aggravating 
statements or speeches.  
3. The Limits of Criminal Legislation in both incidents 
In comparing the application of criminal punishment to both cases above, in both 
situations, persons have expressed themselves in an insensitive and offending 
manner; both situations were only brought to public attention by the television based 
on the media’s opinion in the respective circumstances that the events were 
appropriate for general attention. Both situations also arose out of private interaction. 
However, the BNP case clearly reflected a disposition of hatred towards a particular 
group (Muslims) and a feeling of superiority over that group. We analyse the rationale 
behind a verdict of acquittal in this case:  
It will be noted in the first instance that the charges brought against the BNP party 
officials were that the men ‘used words or behaviour intended to stir up racial hatred’. 
They were not charged for racially aggravating behaviour per se. We hold that this 
was an inadequate assessment by the prosecution of the facts of the matter based 
on the weakness of the criminal legislation provisions for racial crime. The Crime and 
Disorder Act (1998) primarily provides for racially aggravating offences as arising 
where a person demonstrates hostility against a person or members of a racial group. 
Since the statements made by Nick Griffin and his colleague were about a religious 
group and unlike the CBB housemates’ racist taunts were not made directly to any 
members of the group(Muslims) under attack, it is obvious that the provisions of the 
Act would not apply in this matter.  
The words uttered by both BNP officials were clearly evidence of their hostility 
towards Muslims. To deny this would be clearly disingenuous. How can a political 
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party and its officials clearly state that a group of persons are turning a country into a 
‘multi-racial hell-hole’ and seek to expel these persons and yet be found to be without 
hatred? Or is it likely that the officials believe Islam is a ‘wicked, vicious faith’ and yet 
feel no hatred for the adherents of the religion?  
The terrorist videos shown in the UK and beyond in the aftermath of the USA 
September 11th and the London July 7th bombings are always held up by both States 
as evidence of ‘hatred’ of the West by the terrorist. In the current trials of the persons 
accused of aiding the London bombings, videos denouncing the West and Western 
international political activity, life styles etc, have been held up by the Prosecution as 
evidence of intention to engage in terrorist activity, no doubt a racially motivated 
behaviour. Will it therefore be right to dismiss such private videos because they are 
not intended to stir up hatred being addressed only to persons of a like mind? Is the 
right to free speech without a limit in consideration of the use of words which will 
constitute racial abuse?  
We note that although it was not referred to in the instant case, it is important to 
mention also the recent Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 because of its 
significance in the UK race relations debate. This Act broadens the scope covered 
under the 1976 Race Relations Act, (as amended in 2000) by including the use of 
‘threatening’ words or behaviour against another on the basis of race or religion as a 
criminal offence.37 However, the Act limits the offences under the legislation to those 
involving the use of threatening words to incite hatred. Words which may be abusive, 
critical or insulting do not come under the scope of the Act and the burden of proof 
rests on the Prosecution to prove criminal intent.38
We find that even this Act given its scope will not address our concerns with how 
much impact speech has in its potential to give rise to racially aggravating behaviour. 
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For one, there is the presumption of a criminal offence only where there is a ‘victim’ 
as opposed to where a statement is made without causing offence to those who hear 
or perceive the action. Also, the action or words must be made in a ‘threatening’ 
manner to this victim or group of victims; neither of which applied in the Nick Griffin 
case. As in BNP case therefore, without the proof that the contested words were 
made in a threatening manner to any particular victim or group of victims, there would 
still have been no sustainable charge against the BNP officials.  
Be that as it may, the verdict of acquittal in the BNP case more than in the CBB 
matter, reveals the limitations of criminal legislation to tackle racial discrimination. 
First, current legislative provisions do not incorporate the probability that racially 
aggravating words or behaviour are frequently made in the absence of the group to 
which hostility is targeted. This means that even children and other minors can be 
constantly exposed to racially inciting statements from persons in a position of 
authority. Second, the greater duty of care which arises with the responsibility of all 
persons in public office (politicians, teachers, civil servants, pastors, etc) to maintain 
social cohesion by refraining from insensitive and inflammatory remarks is not 
addressed by legislation. 39
 
 The freedom to hold private beliefs including political 
beliefs must be contained if such beliefs include manifest hatred and feelings of 
superiority against others. Third, the State must bear in mind that criminal legislation 
may in certain cases punish offenders under the due process of the law. However, 
the multiracial societies of the modern world must go beyond legislative means of 
controlling incidences of racial conduct, including speeches. Greater action by civil 
regulation promoting harmony amongst the diverse groups in society need to be 
adopted in order to address the deep emotional and psychological prejudices which 
lead to racism.  
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PART III: A MORE ENDURING ALTERNATIVE: EDUCATION AND SOCIAL ACTION 
1. Tackling the roots of racism: When should free speech be limited?  
Without impeding the freedom of expression of every person, the law must find 
evidence of an intention towards racist action in order to hold that a person is rightly 
accused of racially motivated behaviour particularly when such behaviour is manifest 
only as speech. It is this unwillingness to categorise all unpleasant speech as 
criminal that finds international legal instruments recognising the right to freedom of 
expression40
 
.  
We accept that is important to protect the individual’s freedom to speak without fear 
of oppression from (il)legitimate authority or, without undue sensitivity to what others 
may find objectionable. We wish to draw attention however to the fact that not the 
root causes of prejudice or hate which subsequently overflow to criminal acts must 
be addressed by domestic authorities as well. As we mentioned earlier, the law 
cannot force emotions. But regulation and social action can aid a social re-think 
amongst a diverse society. Often there argument such as was stated by the judge in 
the BNP case above is offered as a justification for the right of every person to 
express themselves. An individual may be free and have the right to expression, but 
such freedom must yield to another person’s right as well.  
 
Our point here is that the law and the courts must recognise that there has been a 
misuse of the freedom of expression when such an expression is motivated only by 
reason of the victim’s race and thus becomes ‘hate speech’41. In this respect, we are 
of the view that although the judge in the BNP case had also counselled the jury that 
the rights granted by the freedom of expression were accompanied by duties not to 
abuse those rights, his statement above was not sufficiently clear on the requisite 
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limits to free speech. The statement also did not take into account the peculiar nature 
of race relations. It also ignored the capacity of privately held opinion including the 
private opinion of organisations and political groups (which sadly now include 
terrorists) to incite racial hatred.  
This judicial error in not finding the BNP statements as ‘racist’ and ‘likely to stir up 
hatred’ perpetuates further errors in appropriately identifying and punishing hate 
speech and crimes42
a. Error in identification of what constitutes racist behaviour amongst private 
persons: The immediate reaction to an allegation of racist behaviour is for the 
person accused to state categorically, “I am not a racist person” which begs 
the question whether racist behaviour is a characteristic or personality trait, 
which it most certainly is not. 
. These errors are: 
b. Error in distinctions of what can or; cannot, be said: Here, there is an 
underlying assumption wrongly held, that freedom of expression implies a 
license to free speech in the most literal sense. This is also not a correct 
interpretation of this category of political rights. Quite rightly, freedom of 
expression enables a person to speak without fear of harassment by 
government or any other group which seeks to restrict a citizen’s right to 
participate freely in a democratic society. However, freedom of expression is 
not a grant of licence to attack an individual or group identity; or to rob 
another person of that equal right to respect and human dignity.   
 
These errors have become conditioned into society – that racist remarks do not make 
a person racist; only serious attacks would suffice such as killing other persons of a 
different race or destruction of their property, a fundamentally flawed and by 
implication, dangerous perception of race discrimination.43
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In Handyside v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights (Eur Ct H.R) 
laid down a deciding statement on the question of an individual’s right to express 
himself including for speech which is adjudged to be offensive. In that case, the 
applicant had complained of a violation of Art. 10 on Freedom of Speech in the 
ECHR, in respect of a prosecution against him under the UK Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 (as amended, 1964). The Eur Ct H.R found a prima facie violation of Art. 10, 
which had occurred in the government’s seizure of the applicant’s materials, stating 
its reasoning as follows: 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is 
applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoffensive, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the 
state or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
society.44
However and more importantly, the Court ultimately held that there had been no 
violation of the freedom of expression because subject to Art. 10(2) which provides 
that the right is subject to certain restrictions ‘prescribed by law and necessary in a 
democratic society’, the publication included “sentences or paragraphs that young 
people at a critical stage of their development could have interpreted as an 
encouragement to indulge in precocious activities harmful for them or even to commit 
certain criminal offences."
  
45
 
 Thus the UK government was within its rights to restrain 
the publication and had not violated the Applicant’s freedom of expression by doing 
so. 
In propagating the right to freedom of expression, the legal limitations to this freedom, 
as it concerns us in this particular discourse, that referred to in Article 10(2) ECHR 
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‘for the protection of the reputation or right of others’, and the ramifications thereof 
particularly where the media are involved, are of critical importance. In Jersild v 
Denmark46, an application was brought to the Eur Ct H.R by a journalist, Jersild, who 
had been convicted under Danish law for a television interview conducted with a 
group of youths, the Greenjackets who had used the opportunity to make racist 
remarks on minority groups in the country. The Court acknowledged that the racist 
remarks by the youths “were more than insulting to members of the targeted groups 
and did not enjoy the protection of Article 10"47
 
.  
The Court held contrary to the opinion of the Danish Supreme Court, that Jersild 
being a journalist, had indeed been serving the public interest by bringing to attention 
the fact that there were neo Nazis in Denmark, according to his claim; he thus did no 
more than bring to light, matters of public interest. The Court finding a violation of 
Jersild’s freedom of expression by the Danish authorities, was of the view that 
punishing a journalist for contributing to matters of public interest including presenting 
statements by others which were racist as in the case, hindered the media from 
making such contribution.48
 
 
The dividing line of determining ‘intent’ which would clarify what would or would not 
amount to hate speech in particular or an expression of racism in  general, was 
offered in Gunduz v Turkey.49 In that case a leader of a religious sect was invited 
onto a television programme where he faced questions and debates from the public. 
In the course of the programme he made a number of statements which were 
deemed to be ‘hate speech’ by the Turkish authorities. The Eur Ct H.R stated that 
whereas there was no doubt that concrete expressions of free speech which were 
insulting to certain individuals or groups were not protected by Art. 10 as was 
decided in the Jersild case, it must be shown that there was an intent to stir up 
Journal of Comparative Law 
Islamic University of Uganda 
Vol 3 (Jan 2009) pp135-172 
 
 26 
violence by adopting the insulting remarks, which given the contents and context of 
the programme, was not established in the instant case.50
 
     
In respect of the sequence of aggravating behaviour in the CBB programme, aside 
from the admissions of guilt by Ms Goody in subsequent interviews on the damaging 
nature of her words to Ms Shetty, it is not conclusive that Ms Goody and the others 
also accused, acted as they did because they having preconceived same, intended 
racially motivated aggravation towards Ms Shetty. The choice of words used are an 
unpleasant indication of the manner in which persons manifest their anger with 
others of different racial distinctions in modern Britain; but a view of the reality 
nevertheless.  
 
The same cannot be the same of the BNP case. There can be no doubt that the 
statement ‘Let’s show these ethnics the door’ manifesting as a belief of a national 
party founded on principles of racial prejudice was intended to stir up the listeners to 
racial hatred of the group to which the statement referred. In addition, it cannot be 
expected that public persons do not have a greater responsibility to ensure that their 
statements or actions particularly in their public capacity do not incite others to hatred. 
Politicians in modern society have the greater task of social cohesion where they are 
part of a diverse community. The expression of a political manifesto which is in 
contrast with the underlying values  of a democratic diverse society, does not pass 
the test of ‘necessity’ for a democratic society under Art.10(2) ECHR and ought to 
have been a cause for alarm and not merely accepted as a right to free speech given 
the context and content of the statements.51
 
 
The continuous regeneration of Human Rights discourses in both academic and non-
academic circles revolve around these complexities of determining when certain 
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rights must give way for others in preserving stability in diversity. Coincidentally 
published after an article on racial relations in the UK which generated substantial 
debate 52 , the Government White Paper ‘Fairness for All’, establishing the new 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), noted that ‘the promotion of a 
wider culture of respect for human rights will also be important in developing 
strategies to promote good relations between different groups of people, building and 
encouraging cohesive communities’53
 
. 
UK legislation includes a Human Rights Act (HRA)54 which from its title appears to be 
a composite document on these fundamental rights55. The Act includes those rights 
analogous to the fundamental rights of freedom of expression: the right to privacy; 
thought and conscience and; the freedom of expression. 56 These rights however 
have restrictions which would apply in the interest of national security, public morals 
and in the protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons.57 As cited earlier in 
our discussion of the CBB incident, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides an 
instance of legal protection of the rights and freedom of others where it limits the 
freedom of expression granted under the Human Rights Act by making racially 
aggravated words and behaviour of private persons punishable under criminal law.58
 
   
Media events like those which have formed the basis for our discourse reiterate an 
important feature of the Human Rights debates – the preservation of the inalienability 
of a human right to respect and dignity even under domestic law. Referring to the 
inalienable nature of certain human rights, Donnelly J (2007, p.284) states that in 
concept at least, they are ‘the equal and inalienable entitlements of all individuals that 
may be exercised against the state and society’ and ‘are a distinctive way to seek to 
resolve social values such as justice and human flourishing’59
 
.  
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It is evident from the sensitive area of racial behaviour in private encounters that the 
human rights principles of respect and dignity for all persons which have evolved into 
race discrimination laws need to assume greater effectiveness if they are to achieve 
the law’s mission of social control. But they can only do so if the individuals in society 
first appreciate that all human beings must be treated with equal dignity for no other 
reason than that they are human.  
 
The question of when freedom of expression should be balanced against another’s 
freedoms has also been considered in UK domestic courts. The cases of Norwood v 
DPP and Hammond v DPP are instructive. Generally, the courts have taken a 
cautious stance of limiting the freedom of expression where such expression is 
clearly offensive to the public60
 
. Norwood v DPP also involved the BNP. There, a 
BNP organiser was charged under S.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. He had placed 
in the front window of his home a poster containing the words, ‘Islam out of Britain’ 
and ‘Protect the British people’. It was alleged that his conduct was motivated by 
hostility towards members of the Islamic faith. The District judge found that although 
the accused was free to express himself pursuant to Article 10 ECHR, he was 
restricted from doing so if it would constitute an offence to others. In his review of the 
case, Auld LJ (p.33) on appeal noted that the action of the BNP organiser ‘could not, 
on any reasonable basis be dismissed as merely an intemperate criticism or protest 
against the tenets of the Muslim religion, as distinct from an unpleasant and insulting 
attack on its followers generally’.  
Although the decision in Hammond v DPP61 is similar to that of Norwood, we do not 
find that they are exactly on all fours. Indeed the contrast between the two cases 
appears similar to our view of the contrast between the CBB and the BNP 
programmes respectively. In this case, a protester while preaching in a pubic place, 
Journal of Comparative Law 
Islamic University of Uganda 
Vol 3 (Jan 2009) pp135-172 
 
 29 
held up a sign with the words ‘Stop Immorality’; Stop Homosexuality’; ‘Stop 
Lesbianism’; ‘Jesus is Lord’. He refused to leave the area in spite of attacks on his 
person by members of the public. He was charged under S.5 of the Public Order Act. 
At the Magistrates’ court, he was convicted on the charge. On appeal at the 
Divisional Court, May LJ agreed that the appellant had a right to freely express 
himself under Art.10 ECHR and under Art.9 (freedom of religion). However, the judge 
was of the view that the freedom of expression in a democratic society such as the 
UK implied that tolerance must be shown to other persons. 
 
Without departing from the scope of our considerations, we must lend our criticism of 
this decision to Geddis A (2004, p.866). The latter writes that to ask the accused  
‘to choose between presenting his belief in such a “non-insulting” fashion or 
not speaking at all – because of the “need to show tolerance towards all 
sections of society” – is to, in effect, tell him that society will not tolerate the 
pubic expression of his core beliefs’.     
 
Balancing the propriety of personal conduct with the need to acknowledge that other 
persons in society are free to live their own lives the way the want irrespective of the 
peculiarities of their social group needs even greater caution than a resort to 
legislation. For how can tolerance mean ‘not criticising’ or ‘not expressing 
disagreement with another’s view’? Whether in pubic or private, the freedom of 
expression cannot be restricted by a blanket ban on not speaking at all. People must 
be free to say what they feel. They cannot however be encouraged to believe that 
they are better than others and so deserve greater political freedom.  
 
We are aware that some may argue then that Christians such as in the Hammond 
case, ought not to say that others of a certain persuasion are destined for hell. 
Neither can any religious group threaten others with harm such as the recent terrorist 
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activity earlier referred to have undertaken. What is crucial is what is said, how it is 
said and the effect the statement has on the relations with members of a different 
group. A call to arms against a racial group cannot be equated with a remark that a 
certain person is a dirty fellow. Criticism of a person’s views cannot be equated with 
an avowal to deport every one who holds that view.  
 
There is no doubt that this is a difficult task for both the legislature and the courts. As 
Gellman S.& Lawrence F. (2004, p.437)62
 
 argue, although the line between the two is 
not always easy to draw, thoughts and expressions may not be punished, but 
criminal intents and effects may. In our particular reflections, a statement borne out of 
feelings of hatred for a particular group manifesting an intention to deny that group or 
a member of that group the right to be left to go about his or her business must be 
limited. The question is how can it be done? How can the society proceed from 
nipping the harm at the initial stages? 
2. Addressing interpersonal relations  
Racial behaviour stems from personal bias and insensitivity, abstract ideals which the 
material machinery of legislative enforcement cannot sufficiently address without 
relying on the fundamental basis for justifying the citizen’s right to legal protection 
from racially aggravated behaviour.  The conclusions of the 1999 Macpherson Inquiry 
Report which followed after an inquiry into the Metropolitan Police’s investigations of 
the murder of a black teenager Stephen Lawrence was emphatic on the need to 
protect persons from racially aggravated behaviour. In doing so, it warned as to the 
subtleties of racially aggravated behaviour and the need for the law to do more to 
prevent racist acts between private persons.  
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The Report stated that in general terms, ‘”Racism" ‘consists of conduct or words or 
practices which advantage or disadvantage people because of their colour, culture or 
ethnic origin. In its more subtle form it is as damaging as in its overt form.’63 The 
Report also elaborated on what may be perceived as a racist incident suggesting that 
‘a racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any 
other person’64
 
. 
The Macpherson Report analysed the differences between these subtle and overt 
forms of racially aggravated behaviour. It borrowed the term ‘unwitting or 
unintentional racism’ from an earlier report to Parliament by Lord Scarman into the 
Brixton Disorders in 1981 65
To the extent that hostility, prejudice and fear remain as commonly felt 
attitudes in the majority population, there is a context in which a minority of 
that majority may feel tempted to translate their own more extreme versions 
of these attitudes into action in the form of racial attacks and harassment.
. In the Brixton Disorders report, Lord Scarman had 
posited the view that while it would be wrong to adjudge the entire British society as 
racist; there was the possibility of an unwitting racist approach found in the 
discriminatory actions of either public or private persons in British society. A 1989 
Home Office Report by the Racial Attacks Group appears to substantiate Lord 
Scarman’s suggestion of unwitting racism: 
66
 
 
Lord Macpherson’s view in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry was that unwitting racism 
result from a variety of factors including a lack of understanding; ignorance or 
mistaken beliefs; well intentioned but patronising words or actions and; unfamiliarity 
with the behaviour or cultural traditions of people or families from minority ethnic 
communities.67 This perception underscores the view that ‘it is not human diversity in 
general that is troublesome for a theory of human rights. The troubles are caused by 
a particular type of diversity: diversity of belief and value’68. 
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To counter these problems, the Macpherson Report in one of its Recommendations69 
suggested amendment of the National Curriculum to include educating the public 
through initiatives aimed at valuing cultural diversity and which would assist the 
prevention of racism70
  
. This recommendation was stated as follows: 
… in creating strategies under the provisions of the Crime & Disorder Act or 
otherwise Police Services, local Government and relevant agencies should 
specifically consider implementing community and local initiatives aimed at 
promoting cultural diversity and addressing racism and the need for focused, 
consistent support for such initiatives.71
 
 
Another recommendation was for the application of race legislation to private 
exchanges between persons. The Report suggested that ‘…consideration should be 
given to amendment of the law to allow prosecution of offences involving racist 
language or behaviour, … where such conduct can be proved to have taken place 
otherwise than in a public place’72
 
. In essence, the Report sought to extend the 
scope of race legislation not only to private persons but also to make private 
expressions of racially aggravating behaviour even where these were not done in 
public, punishable under the criminal law. 
For the law to be an effective means to control racially aggravated behaviour in 
private encounters, there is need to ground the legislation in the fundamental raison 
d’ etre for determining that a person must be free from racially aggravated attacks.  
Incorporating human rights principles into the legal framework of a country is not 
enough. The public have to be educated on the rationale for their adoption. To 
provide for criminal punishment as a means of protecting persons from racial 
discrimination will not suffice on the long run to avert the occasions of threatening 
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behaviour and its often unfortunate results. Furthermore, these categories of 
legislation may not actually be able to fulfil any real purpose so long as they cannot 
justify curtailing the parallel fundamental right of every individual to express 
themselves without providing a cogent reason for doing so. In our view, this 
justification is first met by increased social awareness on the right of every person to 
be treated with respect and dignity. 
 
The inclusion of the right to be treated with respect and dignity in legal provisions 
implies that the law recognises that persons cannot be abused or insulted; their 
cultures mocked and their values attacked. Bullying, discriminatory behaviour and 
segregation flourish in an atmosphere of denial of the intrinsic equal status of every 
human person particularly when the law does not protect and, the domestic legal 
machinery cannot preserve, the inalienability of these rights. For modern multicultural 
society to have a more positive view of racial distinctions; a view ‘which recognises a 
positive value in diversity, a meaningful acceptance of other cultures and respect for  
their values, traditions and deep moral differences,’ 73
 
 that society must have a 
thorough understanding of the inalienable nature of the human right to dignity.   
The EU Directive 2000/43 74  which sets out the legal framework for the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin in the EU, provides that ‘an unwanted conduct related to racial 
or ethnic origin’ which has the ‘purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person 
and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment’ amounts to discriminatory behaviour for the purposes of the Directive.75 
However, although the scope of the Directive makes it applicable to ‘all persons, as 
regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies’76 its provisions 
are more applicable to the public spectrum.77   
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On the other hand, the UK HRA which incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights(ECHR)78
 
 alludes to social, economic and political rights and freedoms 
but with very little mention of the basis of the human rights concept or of the right of a 
person to be treated with dignity. Article 3 of the HRA on ‘Prohibition of Torture’ is the 
nearest the Legislation makes to an admission that individuals have a right to be free 
from abuse. It states that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’  
The absence of a reference to the right of every individual person to be considered 
equal and to be treated with dignity in the UK Human Rights Act and which as is 
expected, is not covered by race discrimination legislation such as the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (as amended 2000) or criminal legislation on race discrimination 
such as the Public Order Act 1984 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994, make it highly improbable that anything more than moral opprobrium can be 
extended for the type of racist bullying that went on in the private CBB dwelling. The 
efficacy of these legislation are already seen in the acquittal in the Nick Griffin (and 
the BNP) case. Thus, the everyday incidences of derogations from this fundamental 
human right amongst private persons79
 
 and which are the bedrock of racial tension in 
any multicultural society cannot be effectively tackled by relevant UK legislation.  
Domestic recognition in law of the right to dignity affords the judiciary a composite 
framework on which to determine whether the purpose of race legislation and the 
parallel criminal provisions have been contravened in the event of a case hinging on 
an accusation of racially aggravated offences in the private realm. The judicial duty of 
interpreting the law in human rights matters as they relate to individual rights to 
freedom of expression will be enhanced where the courts have the interpretative 
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mandate of determining whether words or actions not only appear to be racially 
motivated, but also amount to attacks on dignity. In the Nick Griffin decision therefore, 
the judge bearing in mind that the law seeks ultimately to protect the dignity and 
respect due to every individual may have offered a different view on the limits to free 
speech, to the effect that words or behaviour which people find “unacceptable, 
unpalatable and sensitive” when they are used in a racially discriminatory context, 
are indeed ‘unacceptable’ and amount to an abuse of the right of others to their 
dignity and therefore will not be tolerated by law.  
 
3. Education and Protection from racially aggravating conduct 
What is needed is for a more robust and positive response to satisfy the needs of a 
multi-ethnic and socially diverse population and, to address the constant flux in the 
state of race relations which issues of increased restrictions in immigration and 
asylum policies; overburdening of housing and social benefits schemes; media 
portrayal of cultural diversity arouse as the national demography is altered.  
 
The problem is not that the laws do not recognise the need to ensure that people feel 
safe and secure in the UK. The problem is what the CBB 2007 and Channel Four 
have highlighted, albeit unwittingly. It is that in the realm of private relations, the law 
may not prove an adequate guarantee that people can go about their daily lives 
confident that their right to be treated with respect and dignity is protected where the 
legal framework and cultural policy do not support these principles. However, the law 
can provide the impetus for the important non-legal means by which race relations 
between private persons can be improved.  
 
In our view, criminal punishment for racially aggravated behaviour does not address 
the underlying causes of the misconceptions and prejudices which give rise to racist 
Journal of Comparative Law 
Islamic University of Uganda 
Vol 3 (Jan 2009) pp135-172 
 
 36 
behaviour. Borrowing from the Macpherson recommendation for a review of the 
National Curricula, a primary reorientation of the classroom curricula towards a 
“knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of ... national minorities and 
majorities”80
 
 as suggested in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC) and echoed in the Council of Europe’s Framework for the Protection 
of Local Minorities (FCPNM), is necessary. The value of a well rounded and sound 
class room education to inform the public particularly the young on the heritage and 
cultures of other persons cannot be underestimated.  
In terms of national curricula properly speaking, programmes and policies aimed at 
celebrating (not establishing) cultural diversity are more beneficial than hospitality- 
style gestures which do more to obstruct than entrench cohesion of different ethnic 
groupings. Such subtle aids to discrimination include the lack of well structured 
integration policies for immigrants and asylum seekers such as the offering of free 
translation options to non-native speakers rather than an emphasis on learning the 
language; the slow but steady transformation of neighbourhoods into racial 
neighbourhoods with the provision of housing facilities to a particular group in certain 
locations; media publicity to inflammatory speech and race motivated incidents which 
do not condemn the acts but merely represent them for publicity sake.  
 
It could be argued that none of the above is within the immediate interests of national 
governments and domestic policy making faced with a rapidly expanding diverse 
population to address. It could also be argued that allowing for immigrants to feel 
welcome in a society by not restricting their ability to communicate in their language 
or to maintain their fraternal connections is conducive to their integration and could 
be seen as part of a policy towards what is referred to as ‘affirmative action’ in the 
United States.81 However, isolation of immigrants from the native population be it by 
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a national policy of segregation or by the adoption of populist (whether of immigrants’ 
or natives’) ideas that every racial and cultural expression must be preserved at all 
costs neither fulfils this right to dignity nor, reflects favourably on integration and on 
social cohesion of a multicultural society in general82
 
.  
Given its freedom to provide information and entertainment to the public, there is also 
some measure of action needed by the media83
 
. Broadcasts of cultural programmes 
presenting the beliefs or values of the different races in society assist towards a 
factual representation of suspected areas of differences. Some caution is needed in 
such representations - patronising, distorted and badly researched programmes on 
culture and lifestyle of a group can exacerbate racial tensions. The NGO 
representatives at the 7th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy 
emphasised this duty on the media:  
The role of public service broadcasting is especially important in providing 
diverse content for all segments of the society. At the same time there is an 
important task in front of public service broadcasting and other general or 
mainstream media, namely to contribute to integration and social cohesion 
taking into account increasing multicultural character of European societies. 
When we are mentioning need for media contribution to social cohesion and 
integration we have in mind negative effects of the fragmentation of the 
audiences, insufficient access to the media for minorities and 
misrepresentations of minorities in the media.84
   
 
Some may argue that the right to respect and dignity is vague and imprecise and will 
add nothing to the general understanding of individual liberties. We do not share this 
view. Respect and dignity may be moral issues but they are more importantly ideals 
which every individual in a free society exercises claim over. The right to be treated 
with respect and dignity immediately determines that racially aggravating words and 
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behaviour are a fundamental disrespect of the intrinsic and inalienable freedom of all 
human beings; and a right which the State does well to maintain for the peaceful co-
existence of its citizenry. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the diverse communities of modern society, racially aggravating behaviour is a real 
threat to the peaceable co-existence much needed across a multicultural terrain. 
Racism resonates with fundamental misapplication of values expressed in violent 
reaction to real or imagined threats. Often borne out of prejudices fostered by an 
ignorance about other peoples’ history and culture, racist behaviour is misguidedly 
adopted as an [in]effective means of establishing a person’s refusal to be treated 
without the ‘respect’ that person presumes he or she deserves. The ensuing 
response of racist thinking is very clearly an attack on the dignity of other persons; 
and a lack of respect for the intrinsic humanity of that other person. 
 
Domestic race legislation attempts to combat these shortcomings by extending the 
frontiers of international legislation to directly apply in the national setting. Apart from 
the obvious aim of compliance with international human rights standards, domestic 
race legislation in addition to its central role of social control, publicly condemns and 
provides punishment for racist behaviour to other persons in society. It could also be 
assumed that these laws also seek to act as a deterrence to persons and institutions 
in society. 
 
The lessons from Celebrity Big Brother (UK) 2007 and The Secret Agent television 
programmes primarily inform of the current state of race discriminatory in the private 
spectrum. They also emphasise the limitations of UK race legislation in addressing 
racially aggravating behaviour when this occurs between persons. Most legal 
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protection covers acts done in public or incidences arising in public institutions. Even 
so, criminal punishment while reprimanding offenders be they pubic offenders, 
institutions or their officers, does not address the wider underlying causal factors of 
racially motivated crimes – the lack of respect for human dignity. 
 
Aside from alluding to international covenants guaranteeing human rights, the 
domestic realm needs to adopt the further roles of education and prevention to give 
further reach to its central role of social control. In the UK, this will require in the first 
instance, legal recognition of the rationale in international covenants’ provisions  
which propose “the right of every person to be treated with respect and dignity”. 
Rather than arising by way of a subsequent counter-attack to racist behaviour as 
consecutive UK race legislation have become, including this fundamental principle of 
human rights in a human rights legal framework such as the UK HRA  ensures that 
the law fulfils its principal objective of protecting human freedom and, anticipates 
racial action. By this means also, the law is equipped with the capacity to punish 
even private offenders be they in public or private places. 
 
In addition, the application of legislative force to the necessary ‘non-legal’ means of 
tackling and averting racist behaviour through expanding national curricula on 
inclusive diversity education is also required of the legislative process. By inclusive 
diversity education, we refer to those learning modes characterised by an 
examination of the common human values and their expressions across the racial 
divide. Furthermore, local community activities and public awareness strategies, 
including action by the media which respect cultural differences and emphasise our 
collective humanity, will prove more beneficial than those which ‘celebrate’ the 
differences in multicultural society.   
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The real lessons from Television is for the modern world as it settles into the 21st 
century to reconnect with the rationale for the human rights ideals – the inviolable 
dignity of the human person. As yet, it proves less arduous for the law to compel 
institutional compliance with human rights anti-discriminatory provisions than to 
regulate the action of individuals in their private encounters. Yet, the often disastrous 
consequences of race tensions in the private spectrum revive the urgency for 
legislative action in containing the every day racially aggravating behaviour which 
mars peaceful co-existence.  
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